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Spoofing Detection in Automatic Speaker
Verification Systems Using DNN Classifiers
and Dynamic Acoustic Features
Hong Yu , Zheng-Hua Tan, Senior Member, IEEE, Zhanyu Ma , Senior Member, IEEE,
Rainer Martin, Fellow, IEEE, and Jun Guo
Abstract— With the development of speech synthesis technol-
ogy, automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems have encoun-
tered the serious challenge of spoofing attacks. In order to
improve the security of ASV systems, many antispoofing counter-
measures have been developed. In the front-end domain, much
research has been conducted on finding effective features which
can distinguish spoofed speech from genuine speech and the
published results show that dynamic acoustic features work more
effectively than static ones. In the back-end domain, Gaussian
mixture model (GMM) and deep neural networks (DNNs) are the
two most popular types of classifiers used for spoofing detection.
The log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) generated by the difference of
human and spoofing log-likelihoods are used as spoofing detection
scores. In this paper, we train a five-layer DNN spoofing detection
classifier using dynamic acoustic features and propose a novel,
simple scoring method only using human log-likelihoods (HLLs)
for spoofing detection. We mathematically prove that the new
HLL scoring method is more suitable for the spoofing detection
task than the classical LLR scoring method, especially when the
spoofing speech is very similar to the human speech. We exten-
sively investigate the performance of five different dynamic
filter bank-based cepstral features and constant Q cepstral
coefficients (CQCC) in conjunction with the DNN-HLL method.
The experimental results show that, compared to the GMM-LLR
method, the DNN-HLL method is able to significantly improve
the spoofing detection accuracy. Compared with the CQCC-based
GMM-LLR baseline, the proposed DNN-HLL model reduces the
average equal error rate of all attack types to 0.045%, thus
exceeding the performance of previously published approaches
for the ASVspoof 2015 Challenge task. Fusing the CQCC-
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based DNN-HLL spoofing detection system with ASV systems,
the false acceptance rate on spoofing attacks can be reduced
significantly.
Index Terms— Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC),
deep neural networks (DNNs) classifier, human log-likelihood
(HLL), log-likelihood ratios (LLRs), speaker verification, spoofing
detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS a low cost and flexible biometric solution to personauthentication, automatic speaker verification (ASV) has
been widely applied in telephone or network access control
systems, such as telephone banking or apartment security [1].
ASV technology aims to verify the registered speaker’s iden-
tity by analyzing the speech signal and comparing it against
pretrained models or templates [2]–[5].
However, with the popularity of social networks, more and
more people share their audio or video recordings on social
media platforms. An imposter can easily steal the voiceprint
information of a target speaker through the Internet and use
the stolen information to generate high quality speech signals
similar to those of the target speaker, through voice conversion
(VC) [6], [7] or speech synthesis (SS) [8], [9] techniques. The
generated speech can then be used to attack ASV systems.
This attack is called spoofing.
The mitigation of spoofing attacks has been the focus
of many research works [10]–[12]. There are two general
strategies to protect ASV systems. One is to develop a
more robust ASV system which can resist spoofing attacks.
Unfortunately, research shows that existing ASV systems are
vulnerable to spoofing attacks [13]–[15]. The other popu-
lar strategy is to build a separate spoofing detection sys-
tem which focuses only on distinguishing between natural
and synthetic speech signals [12]. Fig. 1 depicts a block
diagram of the latter approach where a separate spoofing
detection system helps an ASV system to make more accurate
decisions.
Due to the advantage of being easily incorporated into
existing ASV systems, spoofing detection has become an
important topic in antispoofing research [10], [14], [16], [17].
Spoofing detection can be realized either in the feature
domain or the classifier domain. In the feature domain, many
different types of features have been evaluated to find features
2162-237X © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a spoofing detection system used in an ASV system.
which can distinguish the human voice from spoofing speech
more effectively. Magnitude-based features, such as the log-
magnitude spectrum (LMS) and the residual LMS, were tested
in [18]. Phase-based features, e.g., relative phase shift, group
delay (GD), modified GD (MGD), baseband phase differ-
ence, and cosine normalized phase features, were investigated
in [17]–[19]. Spectrum and phase-based cepstral coefficients
features, such as linear-frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCC),
cochlear filter cepstral coefficients, mel-frequency cepstral
coefficients (MFCC), cosine-normalized phase-based cepstral
coefficients, and MGD filter-bank cepstral coefficients were
studied in [17] and [20]–[24]. Other kinds of features, such
as local binary patterns, pitch pattern features, utterance level
i-Vectors [3], and modulation features were also discussed
in [19] and [25]–[27].
The results published in [20] and [28] show that dynamic
acoustic features are more effective than static features in the
spoofing detection task. Moreover, the high frequency regions
of speech play a more important role than the low frequency
regions.
Inspired by the successful application of deep neural net-
works (DNNs) in feature extraction [29]–[31], DNN bot-
tleneck features generated by the hidden layer of a DNN
have also been used in the spoofing detection task. In [32],
the utterance-level spoofing-vectors were generated by com-
puting the mean values of DNN bottleneck features that
were produced by filter bank features. Frame-level DNN
bottleneck features derived from dynamic acoustic fea-
tures, such as dynamic filter-bank, dynamic MFCC, and
dynamic linear prediction cepstral coefficients, were discussed
in [33]. Recurrent neural networks, such as the unidirectional
long-short-term memory network and the bidirectional long-
short-term memory network, were also used to produce
sequence-level bottleneck features in [34].
Summarizing the published experimental results on the
ASVspoofing 2015 database [35], DNN features perform bet-
ter at detecting known spoofing attacks, but worse on detecting
unknown attacks when using Gaussian mixture model (GMM)-
based classifier. Average equal error rates (EERs) of all the
attacks are in the range from 1% to 3%. Dynamic spectrum-
based cepstral coefficients features, such as LFCC, and the
newly published constant-Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [36]
perform better than other features, and average EERs of these
features can be reduced to less than 0.9%.
In the classifier domain, some classical classifiers, e.g.,
GMM-based log-likelihood ratios (GMM-LLRs) [20], lin-
ear discriminant analysis (LDA) [37], probabilistic LDA
(PLDA) [38], binary/one-class support vector machine
(SVM) [39], and DNN were all applied to the spoofing
detection task.
In the GMM-LLR method, two separated GMMs are trained
on the corresponding genuine and spoofing features. Spoofing
detection scores are generated by computing the LLR of
test speech on the two models [17]–[20]. When using the
PLDA/LDA classifiers, two feature vectors, such as mean
i-Vectors or statistical features, which stand for the genuine
class and the spoofing class, should be generated first. Then
spoofing detection scores are produced by evaluating the
similarities between the test feature vectors and the gen-
uine/spoofing feature vectors [25], [34]. In binary/one-class
SVM, the output score of the classifiers can be used for
spoofing detection directly [18], [20], [21], [34]. When a
DNN classifier is applied, human speech and different spoofing
methods are used as training labels and the posterior proba-
bilities gotten from all nodes in the output layer are used to
derive spoofing detection scores [18], [32]–[34].
Published results show that GMM-LLR classifiers trained
using dynamic acoustic features work better than DNN and
other classifiers [18]–[20], [34], so we select GMM-LLR
classifiers as the baseline.
This paper focuses on studying DNN classifiers trained on
dynamic acoustic features. Specifically, we propose a simple
novel scoring method for DNN classifiers, which can make
DNN classifiers perform much better than the baseline GMM-
LLR classifier. The main contributions of this paper include
the following.
1) We propose a new human log-likelihood (HLL)-based
scoring method which uses only the output of the human
node.
2) We mathematically prove that the HLL scoring method
is more suitable for the spoofing detection task than the
classical LLR method, especially, for detecting spoofing
speech which is very similar to the human speech.
3) We investigate the performance of DNN-HLL models
trained by five different dynamic spectrum-based cep-
stral coefficients and CQCC features. The CQCC-based
DNN-HLL model works best on the ASVspoofing 2015
database. The average EER of all 10 attacks can be
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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Fig. 2. Processing flow of computing SBCC and CQCC features, where N , C , and M stand for the number of FFT points, the number of filter bank channels,
and the number of cepstral coefficients, respectively. (a) Block diagram for SBCC extraction. (b) Block diagram for CQCC extraction.
reduced to 0.045%, which, to our knowledge, is the best
performance among all the published results.
4) We integrate the CQCC-based DNN-HLL spoofing
detection classifier with GMM- universal background
model (UBM) and i-Vector-based ASV systems. The
false acceptance rate (FAR) of untrained spoofing attacks
can be reduced significantly.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we introduce the dynamic acoustic features
used for training spoofing detection classifiers. The detailed
DNN structure for spoofing detection and the different scoring
methods are described in Section III. In this section, we also
mathematically prove that the HLL scoring method, using only
the HLL, works better than the classical LLR methods on the
spoofing detection task. The experimental results of spoofing
detection and the effect of integrating spoofing detection and
ASV are discussed in Section IV. We conclude this paper in
Section V.
II. DYNAMIC FEATURES
Since frame level spectrum-based cepstral coefficients
(SBCC) and CQCC work better than other features, such as
phase features and utterance level features, this paper uses
dynamic SBCC and CQCC to evaluate the performance of
DNN classifiers. SBCC features, e.g., MFCC and LFCC, have
been widely used in many speech processing tasks. They
can be created with the procedure shown in Fig. 2(a). First,
the speech signal is segmented into short-time frames with
overlapping windows. Second, the power spectra |X FFT(k)|2
are generated by a frame-wise N-point fast Fourier transform
(FFT). Third, the power spectrum is integrated using an over-
lapping band-limited filter bank with C channels to generate
filter bank features. Finally, after logarithmic compression and
discrete cosine transform (DCT) on the filter bank features, M
coefficients are selected as the SBCC feature.
We evaluate five different SBCC features generated by
different filter banks as shown in Fig. 3. LFCC and MFCC are
generated by linear frequency and mel-frequency rectangular
Fig. 3. Filter banks used for SBCC extraction. (a) TFB. (b) MFB. (c) IMFB.
(d) GFB. (e) IGFB.
filter banks (MFB), respectively. Gammatone filter bank (GFB)
cepstral coefficients (GFCC), which have been successfully
used in speech recognition tasks [40]–[42], are produced by
the GFB which has mel-scale center frequencies and band-
widths in proportion to the equivalent rectangular bandwidth
scale.
The experimental results published in [20] and [28] show
that the high-frequency spectrum of speech is more effective
for the detection of synthetic speech. Therefore, we also
evaluate inverted MFCC (IMFCC) and inverted Gammatone
filter bank cepstral coefficients (IGFCC) which are gener-
ated by the inverted MFB and GFB. These inverted filter
banks have sparser spacing of filters in the low-frequency
region and denser spacing in the higher frequency region
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF SBCC FEATURES USED IN THIS PAPER
emphasizing the importance of the high frequency components
[Fig. 3(c) and (e)].
The details of the SBCC features used in this paper are
described in Table I. Following the suggestion in [20] and [42],
the speech signals were segmented into frames with 20-ms
window length and 10-ms step size. Pre-emphasis and a
Hamming window were applied on the frames before the
spectrum computation. The works in [20] showed that all the
frames of speech are useful for spoofing detection, so we did
not apply any voice activity detection method. When extracting
LFCC, MFCC, and IMFCC, the channel number C is set to
20 and FFT length N is set to 512. When producing GFCC
and IGFCC, C and N are set to 128 and 1024, respectively.
The number of coefficients M of all the SBCC features is set
to 20 (including the 0th coefficient).
As shown in Fig. 2(b), CQCC features are generated from
the constant-Q transform (CQT) [43]. Unlike the short-time
Fourier transform used in the SBCC feature extraction, which
has both uniform time and frequency resolutions, CQT can
capture more detailed time-frequency information of speech
signals. Higher frequency resolution is provided for lower
frequencies and higher time resolution is applied on higher
frequencies. Since the CQT frequency scale is geometrically
spaced, a cepstral analysis method cannot be directly applied
on the power CQT features |X CQT(k)|2 . A modified cepstral
analysis method is taken by using a spline interpolation
method to resample the geometric scale to a uniform grid [36],
and then, after DCT, M CQCC coefficients can be produced.
CQCC features are extracted by the code supplied from
http://audio.eurecom.fr/content/software. The number of bins
per octave is set to be 96 and resampling is applied with a
sampling period of 16. The coefficient number M is also set
to 20 (including the 0th coefficient).
III. CLASSIERS AND SCORING METHODS
This section presents the baseline GMM-LLR classifier and
the proposed DNN-HLL method together with a mathematical
proof that the HLL scoring method works better than the
classical LLR method on the spoofing detection task.
A. GMM-LLR Classifiers
The GMM-UBM approach which has been widely used
in ASV systems [44] can easily be extended to spoofing
detection. As shown in Fig. 4, human/spoofing GMM models
are trained by spoofing detection features extracted from
human/spoofing utterances, respectively, with an expectation
Fig. 4. Block diagram of a GMM-LLR-based spoofing detection system.
maximization algorithm. All spoofed speech samples are fused
together to train one spoofing GMM.
In the test phase, the spoofing detection features extracted
from the test utterances are scored against the human and
spoof GMMs. The LLR is used as spoofing detection score,





{logP(Xi |λhuman) − logP(Xi |λspoof)}
(1)
where X denotes spoofing detection feature vectors with T
frames, λhuman and λspoof are the GMM parameters of human
and spoofing models, respectively.
B. DNN-LLR Classifiers
Spoofing-discriminant DNNs with five hidden layers are
used to distinguish the human/spoofing speech in this paper.
As shown in Fig. 5, each of the hidden layers has 2048 nodes
with a sigmoid activation function. The number of nodes of
the softmax output layer is K + 1, corresponding to human
speech and K different spoofing attacks. Batch normalized
super vectors Fi which are composed of n successive dynamic




Xi− n−12 , . . . , Xi , . . . , Xi+ n−12
]
. (2)
With the help of the computational network toolkit [45],
the DNN is built and trained with stochastic gradient descent
methods. The cross entropy function is selected as the cost
function and the maximum training epoch is chosen as 120.
The mini-batch size is set as 128.
The output of a trained DNN can be used for a spoofing
decision directly or to generate spoofing detection scores.
We use P(h|Fi ) and P(sk |Fi ) (k ∈ (1, . . . , K )) to stand for
the output of the human node and the kth spoofing node,
which also represent the posterior probability that the i th input
super vectors Fi belongs to human speech or the kth spoofing
method.
As shown in (3), when the DNN is used as a decision
device, by counting how many frames are more similar to
a human frame, we can determine whether the input utterance
is spoofed speech, that is
Decision(F) =
{
1, count (P(h|Fi ) > 0.5) > 0.5T
0, otherwise
(3)
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Fig. 5. Spoofing-discriminant DNN.
where F stands for super vectors of the test utterance with
T frames.
When a DNN is used to score the input utterance, the
posterior probabilities given by the output layer can be used
to compute the spoofing detection score. Similar to the LLR
scoring method used in the GMM classifier, we also use
the difference between human and spoofing log-likelihoods



















{log[P(h|Fi )] − log [max (P(sk |Fi ))]} (5)
The spoofing log-likelihood for (4) and (5) is calculated by the
sum or the maximum value of K spoofing nodes, respectively.
The performance of spoofing detection will be evaluated
using EER. In practical applications, a development data set
will be used to find an EER threshold, and when the spoofing
detection score is bigger than this threshold, the input utterance
will be accepted as a human utterance, otherwise it will be
rejected as a spoofing one.
C. DNN-HLL Classifier
We first evaluated the performance of the MFCC-based
DNN-LLR classifier on the ASVspoof2015 database which
includes 10 different spoofing methods, S1–S10. The exper-
imental results show that, on the S1–S9 attacks, the DNN
classifier can relatively easily distinguish spoofed speech from
human speech. However, under the S10 attack, the classifier
performs quite badly (more details will be introduced in
Section IV).
To understand this behavior, we investigate output values
of the DNN classifier. Let x denote the output of the human
node. The distribution of x is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Distribution of the human node output. (a) Human. (b) S1–S9. (c) S10.
Fig. 7. Relationship between log(x) and log(x/(1 − x)).
It is observed that, most of the x values of human speech
fall into a high value interval near 1 [Fig. 6(a)]. For easily
detected spoofing utterances (S1–S9), most of the x values
lie in a low value interval near 0 [Fig. 6(b)]. While for some
spoofing utterances which are very difficult to detect (S10), as
shown in Fig. 6(c), most of x still fall into the high value range.
If we use (3) to make the spoofing decision, these utterances
will be wrongly judged as human speech. When using the LLR
scoring method, the spoofing detection scores are calculated by
log(x/(1 − x)). As shown in Fig. 7, in the low value interval,
e.g., x ∈ [0.001, 0.05], log(x), and log(x/(1 − x)) have a
similar distribution. However, in high value interval, e.g., x ∈
[0.95, 0.99], the transformation from log(x) to log(x/(1 − x))
make the distribution become scattered, which will increase
variance value of spoofing detection scores. Scattered scores
are not suitable for the classification task. In the LLR method,
a wrong posterior probability x of one frame, that fall into the
high value interval, will cause a strong positive bias and affect
the average log-likelihood score heavily.
This encourages us to use the log-likelihood of x (human
node outputs), to compute spoofing scores instead of the LLRs.







The HLL score emphasizes frames which achieve a low
“human” score near 0. So, once we have a certain number
of low “human” scores in an utterance, the whole utterance
will be scored as spoofed. This is different from LLR where
low and high “human” scores are given asymmetric score.
In the rest of this section, we mathematically prove that
the HLL scoring method is more suitable for the spoofing
detection task than the LLR method.
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where xi stands for the probability that the i th frame belongs
to human utterance.
Equations (4) and (5),
∑K
k=1 P(sk |Fi ) and max(P(sk |Fi ))
both stand for the probability that the i th frame belongs
to spoofing utterance, so we approximate them as 1 − xi .





[log(xi ) − log(1 − xi )]. (8)
Following the distribution of x shown in Fig. 6, the proba-
bility density functions (PDFs) of x can be assumed to have







, x ∈ [1 − β1, 1]
1 − α
β2
, x ∈ [0, β2]
(9)
where 0 < α < 1 is the probability that x falls into the high
value interval. β1 and β2 ∈ (0, 0.5) stand for the width of
low/high value intervals, respectively.
Through variable substitutions, the corresponding PDFs of







ey1, y1 ∈ [−∞, log β1]
α
β2






























We assume xi meets the independent and identical dis-
tribution condition. Following the central limit theorem, the
distributions of SHLL and SLLR can be approximated by normal
distributions and their mean values and standard deviations can
be computed by the expectations and standard deviations of
y1 and y2 as follows:


















The distributions of human and spoofing scores are illu-
minated in Fig. 8, where mh , σh and ms , σs are mean and
standard deviations of human scores and spoofing scores,
respectively.
In scoring-based spoofing detection tasks, EER is used
to evaluate the performance of different spoofing detection
Fig. 8. Distributions of human and spoofing scores.
methods. Let FRR(θ) and FAR(θ) denote the false rejection
and FARs at threshold θ
FAR(θ) = count(spoof trials with score > θ)
total spoof trials
(16)
FRR(θ) = count(human trials with score < θ)
total human trials
. (17)
FRR(θ) and FAR(θ) are monotonically decreasing and
increasing functions of θ . The EER corresponds to the thresh-
old θEER at which two detection error rates are equal. Because
θEER do not have a closed form solution in the simulated
condition, we select the intersection of two Gaussian curves
as threshold θ , as shown in (18) that is shown at the bottom
of the next page, which is slightly different from the θEER
threshold. Instead of EER, FRR(θ), and FAR(θ) are used to
evaluate the performance of two scoring methods.
FRR(θ) and FAR(θ) can be estimated as
FRR(θ) = CDF(θ |mh, σh) (19)
FAR(θ) = 1 − C DF(θ |ms , σs) (20)
where C DF denotes the cumulative distribution function of
the normal distribution.
Here we set β1 = β2 = 0.05, T = 100. Mean values and
standard variances of SHLL and SLLR can be calculated as1
m_SHLL ≈ 3.97α − 4 (21)
δ_SHLL ≈
√
−(3.97α − 4)2 − 16.96α + 16.97/10 (22)
m_SLLR ≈ 7.94α − 3.97 (23)
δ_SLLR ≈
√
−(7.94α − 3.97)2 + 16.79/10. (24)
In order to simulate the distribution shown in Fig. 6(a), we
set α of human scores as a constant value, αhuman = 0.99.
It means that, for human speech, 99% output values of human
node fall into the high value area. The α value of spoofing
scores, αspoof, changes from 0.01 to 0.9. By decreasing αspoof,
the difference between human and spoofing speech grows.
When αspoof is lower than 0.5, the spoofing attack can be
detected relatively easily [Fig. 6(b)]. When αspoof is larger
than 0.5 and approaches to 0.9, the spoofing attack is difficult
to be detected [Fig. 6(c)].
Using (18), (20), (22), and (24) FAR and false rejection
rate (FRR) computed by LLR and HLL scoring methods are
shown in Fig. 9.
The dotted lines label the areas where the FAR or FRR
generated by the LLR method is larger than that computed by
the HLL method.
1Computed by the Maple software, https://www.maplesoft.com/.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of FRR and FAR generated by different scoring methods.
(a) FRR for αhuman = 0.99. (b) FAR for αhuman = 0.99.
TABLE II
DESCRIPTION OF ASVSPOOF 2015 DATABASE
The results show that when αspoof is bigger than 0.5, FRR
and FAR are still very small, less than 4%, which means
most of the spoofed speech is detected correctly. It proves
that the scoring method works better than the decision method
described in (3).
Comparing the two scoring methods, when αspoof has a
large value, which means the spoofing speech is very similar
to the human speech, the HLL scoring method performs
better than LLR. Only when αspoof is small enough, less than
0.45, the LLR scoring method can work better than the HLL
method. However, in that case, the FRR and FAR of two
scoring methods all tend to 0%. Thus, generally speaking, the
scoring method, which only uses the HLL, is more suitable for
spoofing detection task, especially for detecting high quality
spoofed speech which is very similar to human speech.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Database
The performance of spoofing detection using different fea-
tures and classifiers is evaluated on the ASVspoof 2015
database [35]. As shown in Table II, the database includes
Fig. 10. Average EERs of different spoofing features and classifiers on the
evaluation set.
three sub data sets without target speaker overlap: the training
set, the development set, and the evaluation set. We used
the training set for training spoofing detection classifiers. The
development set and the evaluation set were used for testing.
The training set and development set are attacked by the
same five spoofing methods, where S1, S2, and S5 belong
to VC category and S3, S4 belong to SS category. Regarding
the evaluation set, besides the five known spoofing methods,
there are another five unknown methods, where S6–S9 are VC
methods and S10 is an SS method.
Many recently released results show that the existing
spoofing detection systems perform much worse on detect-
ing the S10 attack, which is a unit-selection-based attack.
The unit-selection-based attack is produced by concatenating
the time-domain waveform directly without vocoding and
feature extraction techniques, which does not carry much
artifacts information from the perspective of feature represen-
tations [11].
The experimental results in the following section will show
that the proposed DNN-HLL classifier is able to work very
well on detecting the S10 attack as well.
B. Experimental Results for GMM and DNN Classifiers
Inspired by the work in [20], the GMM and DNN models
are trained on the  and 2 (first- and second-order frame-to-
frame difference, with 40 dimensions) features introduced in
Section II. When training GMM-LLR classifiers, the mixture
number is set to 512. When training DNN classifiers, a block
of 11 frames SBCC/CQCC(2) are used as the training
data. Hence, the number of nodes of the input layer is 440.
The output layer has five nodes, the first one is for human
speech and the other four are for five known spoofing methods
(S3 and S4 have the same label). EER is used for measuring
spoofing detection performance. The average EERs of different
spoofing features and scoring methods on the evaluation set
are shown in Fig. 10.
It can be observed that, among the five SBCC(2) fea-
tures, GFCC(2) and MFCC(2), which are produced
by the filter banks with large spacing in the high-frequency
region, perform the worst. IMFCC(2) and IGFCC(2),
θ =
σ 2h ms − σ 2s mh + σhσm
√
(mh − ms)2 + 2
(
σ 2h − σ 2s
)
(log σh − log σs)
σ 2h − σ 2s
(18)
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TABLE III
ACCURACIES (AVG. EER IN %) OF DIFFERENT FEATURES AND CLASSIFIERS ON THE EVALUATION SET
TABLE IV
ERROR RATE (%) ON EVALUATION SET, USING
DNN AS A DECISION DEVICE
which are generated by filter banks highlighting the high-
frequency regions, work better. IGFCC(2) performs better
on the GMM-LLR classifier and IMFCC(2) better on
the DNN classifier which is consistent with the findings
in [28].
CQCC(2) performs the best among all the six
investigated features, which indicates that features which
have nonuniform resolution on both time and frequency
domains can capture the spoofing information more
effectively.
Comparing the two different classifiers, the DNN classifier
using LLR as spoofing detection scores (S1DNN and S2DNN),
works similar to the GMM-LLR classifiers. However, when
using the DNN-HLL scoring method (S3DNN), much better
performance can be achieved.
In Table III, we further compare the performance of
GMM-LLR and DNN-HLL classifiers, using (1) and (6) as
scoring methods, respectively.
It is clearly shown that the DNN-HLL model scoring with
the HLL works much better than the GMM-LLR model
scoring with the LLR on all the investigated features. Espe-
cially on S10 attack, which is very difficult to detect, the
DNN-HLL model still works well. The CQCC(2)-based
DNN-HLL classifier can reduce the average EER on unknown
attacks to 0.089%. Moreover, the average EER on all attacks
is reduced to 0.045%, which is almost 10 times better
than the state-of-the-art GMM-LLR classifier. To our knowl-
edge, this is the best performance among all the published
results.
When using the trained DNN as a decision device, the error
rates for detecting human and different spoofed speech on the
evaluation set is shown in Table IV.
It can be observed that when using (3) to make the spoofing
decision, about 15% of spoofing speech will be wrongly
judged as human speech, on average. For the S10 spoofing
attack, the error rate can raise to over 60%. This corroborates
the conclusion in Section III-C that the scoring methods
are more suitable than the decision method for the spoofing
detection task.
C. Analysis of Experimental Results
In Section III-C, we briefly investigate the distribution of
human node outputs of the spoofing detection DNN. Here we
present detailed results in order to analyze the experimental
results in Section IV-B. Histograms of human node outputs
generated by different features are shown in Fig. 11.
It can be observed that the output of the human node are
concentrated in two intervals, around 0 and 1. About 90%
of the outputs from human testing frames fall into the high
value range. When using DNN to make the spoofing decisions
directly, there is no human speech wrongly rejected as spoofed
speech.
On known spoofing attacks (S1–S5), about 80% of the
outputs fall into the low value region, and the known/trained
spoofed speech can be easily detected. On the unknown attacks
S6–S9, which are relatively easy to detect, the ratio of outputs
in low value region has been reduced to 60%, and most of the
spoofing frames can still be correctly detected.
For S10 attack, histograms show that about 60%–70% of the
outputs fall into the high value area, which means most of the
spoofing frames are wrongly accepted as human frames. The
S10 spoofing samples are produced by concatenating the time-
domain waveform of human speech directly without vocoding
and feature extraction techniques, which makes the generated
frame level features very similar to human speech features.
It causes very high error rates in the detection of S10 spoofing
attacks.
We compute the mean and variance values of human and
spoofing scores of speech in the evaluation set. Following
(18) and (20), FAR and FRR of different features and scoring
methods are shown in Table V.
We can find that when detecting S1–S9, which are relatively
easy to distinguish from human speech, the LLR scoring
methods (S1DNN and S2DNN) perform a little better than the
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Fig. 11. Histograms of the human node output generated by different features on human speech and spoofed speeches. (a) MFCC. (b) IMFCC. (c) GFCC.
(d) IGFCC. (e) LFCC. (f) CQCC.
TABLE V
FRR AND FAR(%) ESTIMATED BY SPOOFING SCORES OF
HUMAN/SPOOFING SPEECH IN THE EVALUATION SET
HLL method (S3DNN). For S10 attacks which are very similar
to human speech, the HLL method works much better than
the LLR method.
It also verifies the conclusion in Section III-C that when
the spoofed speech is very different from the human speech
the LLR method performs better than the HLL method, while
TABLE VI
DESCRIPTION OF JOINT ASV AND SPOOFING DETECTION DATABASE
when the spoofed speech is very similar to human speech, the
HLL scoring method works much better.
D. Experimental Results of Joint Spoofing Detection
and ASV System
The effect of fusing ASV and spoofing detection systems is
also evaluated on the ASVspoof 2015 database. The joint ASV
and spoofing detection database is described in Table VI. There
are two kinds of impostor utterances in the database, zero-
effort impostor [Impostor(Z)] and spoofing impostor. Zero-
effort impostor utterances still belong to human speech, but
the speaker IDs are not enrolled in the ASV system. Spoofing
impostor utterances are generated by known [spoofed(K)] and
unknown [spoofed(U)] spoofing methods.
Two classical ASV systems: a GMM-UBM [44] system and
an i-Vector [3] system are evaluated in this paper. In the two
systems, MFCCs with 60 dimensions (static +  + 2) are
selected as the ASV features.
In the GMM-UBM system, two gender-dependent UBMs
of 512 components are trained with the speech data from the
full TIMIT [46] and RSR2015 corpora [47]. Speaker models
are generated by maximum-a posteriori adaptation with the
UBM. ASV scores are calculated by the LLR between speaker
models and the UBM.
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Fig. 12. Fusion of ASV and spoofing detection scores.
In the i-Vector system, gender depended UBMs are also
trained by the full TIMIT and RSR2015 databases. When
training the total variability matrix T, we use the full TIMIT
data consisting of 630 speakers (438 male and 192 female)
and a subset of 10 different sentences for 300 speakers
(157 male and 143 female) from the RSR2015 database. The
dimensionality of the total variability subspace is set as 400.
LDA is used to reduce the dimension of i-Vectors from 400
to 200 and PLDA is used to compute ASV scores [3]. The
same data used for training T are also used to train LDA and
PLDA. Since each target speaker has five different utterances
for enrollment, extracted i-Vectors are averaged to build the
speaker models. Finally the ASV scores are calculated by the
PLDA similarity between the i-Vector of a test utterance and
the claimed speaker model.
The fusion system is shown in Fig. 12. We select the
EER threshold, which is obtained from the ASV scores
generated by genuine and zero-effort impostor utterances in the
development set, as ASV threshold θasv. The EER threshold
obtained from spoofing scores of genuine and spoofing impos-
tor utterances in the development set is used as the spoofing
threshold θspoof.
The EER threshold can be calculated following the proce-
dure described in Algorithm 1, where S stands for ascending
sorted ASV/spoofing scores and L means the correspond-
ing labels. N is the number of development utterances,
which include NT true samples (genuine) and NF false sam-
ples [imposter(Z)/spoofed]. The true sample is labeled as 1.
By finding the index which can get the minimum difference
between F AR and F RR, we obtain the EER threshold θ .
The evaluation speech can be accepted only when its ASV
score and spoofing score are both larger than θasv and θspoof,
respectively, otherwise it will be rejected.
FRR and FAR are used to evaluate the performance of the
ASV system. The experimental results on evaluation set is
shown in Table VII.
When we only use the ASV systems, θasv can distinguish
the genuine speech with impostor(Z) utterances. The i-Vector-
based system performs better than the GMM-UBM system
on defending spoofing attacks. However, the FAR is still sig-
nificantly increased under known/unknown spoofing attacks,
Algorithm 1 EER Threshold Computation
Input: S, L, N , NF , NT
Output: θ
1: F RR = 0; F AR = 0;
2: n f a = NF ; n f r = 0;
3: minDis = +∞; index = 1
4: for i = 1 : N do
5: if L(i) == 1 then
6: n f r = n f r + 1
7: else
8: n f a = n f a − 1
9: F AR = n f a/NF
10: F RR = n f r/NT
11: if abs(F AR − F RR) < minDis then
12: minDis = abs(F AR − F RR)
13: index = i
14: return θ = S(index) − eps
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE FOR JOINT ASV AND CQCC-BASED SPOOFING
DETECTION SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF FRR AND FAR (%) ON THE
EVALUATION SET OF THE ASVSPOOF 2015 DATABASE
which means that many spoofing impostor utterances are
wrongly accepted as genuine utterances.
After combining the ASV system with the spoofing detec-
tion system trained on CQCC features, the FRR is not changed,
which means that no more genuine utterances are rejected
by mistake. The additional spoofing detection system will not
affect the acceptance of genuine utterances.
Comparing the two spoofing detection classifiers, the
CQCC-based DNN-HLL classifier still works better than the
GMM-LLR classifier, especially on resisting unknown spoof-
ing attacks. With the help of the CQCC-based DNN-HLL
spoofing detection classifier, by fusing ASV and spoofing
scores, most of the spoofing imposter utterances are rejected.
In our experimental setting, the i-Vector system performs
worse on detecting imposter (Z) attacks than the GMM-UBM
system. However, on resisting spoofing attacks, we obtain a
better result by fusing the CQCC-based DNN-HLL classifier
with the i-Vector-based ASV system. The FAR can be reduced
to 0.00% on known spoofing attacks and to 0.15% on unknown
attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the performance of GMM and
DNN classifiers in spoofing detection. In order to improve
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the performance of DNN spoofing detection methods we
proposed a novel HLL scoring method, which only uses
human node outputs to compute spoofing detection scores.
We mathematically proved that, the HLL scoring method
is more suitable for the spoofing detection task than the
classical log-likelihoods ratio (LLR) method. Five different
dynamic filter bank-based cepstral features and constant Q
cepstral coefficients (CQCC) were used to train classifiers.
The experimental results shown that CQCC features which
have variable resolution in both time and frequency domains
are more suitable for the spoofing detection task. Comparing
the performance between the state-of-the-art GMM-LLR and
the newly proposed DNN-HLL method on the ASVspoof2015
database, the DNN-HLL method works nearly 10 times better
than the GMM-LLR classifier.
By fusing the DNN-HLL spoofing detection classifier with
the GMM-UBM and i-Vector-based ASV systems, the FRR on
spoofing attacks can be reduced significantly. In comparison
with the two ASV systems, the i-Vector-based system performs
better on resisting spoofing attacks. In the future we will
investigate the performance of the DNN-HLL model on other
kinds of spoofing attacks, such as replay attacks or WaveNet
produced spoofing speech [48].
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